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The construction and maintenance of public facilities involves several sets of stakeholders: the political 
leaders who ultimately decide when, whether, and what to build; the engineers and other government staff 
who provide or oversee design, construction, and maintenance; the private firms supplying design, 
construction, or maintenance services; the taxpayers whose money will fund the project; the lenders who 
supply loan funds permitting the project to go ahead in advance of tax or toll collections; the users of the 
facility; and nearby residents.  The question of which stakeholders should have what role and influence in 
the design, construction, and maintenance of public facilities has become more contentious as they have 
become larger and affected more people. 
 
Proposals to construct large dams have inspired considerable contention in the last few decades as 
political mobilization of nearby residents who will be displaced by the reservoirs they create and of 
environmentalists concerned with the consequences of large dams for the river basin and nearby forests, 
wildlife habitat, or farmland have led to demands for greater public information and participation in project 
definition and design and greater transparency and accountability in construction, operation, and 
maintenance.  Most dam projects proceed within a single country, meaning that stakeholders have to 
secure their influence within the national political system using whatever processes for citizen mobilization 
and input that system allows.  Yet, some dam projects have transnational dimensions, either because the 
project itself involves more than one country or because the government hoping to build the dams needs 
loans from outside.  These transnational aspects sometimes allow stakeholders unable to gain much 
influence in the national political processes to find outside supporters who pressure the government into 
listening to the previously ignored stakeholders. 
 
This case study looks at one of the more famous instances of transnational involvement in stakeholder 
struggles over large dams, the long-running contention over dam construction on the Narmada Rover in 
India.  Most of the controversy has addressed the size and construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam at 
Navagam in Gujarat, but the Narmada Project also includes several large dams at various points in Madhya 
Pradesh as well as medium and small-size dams on the Narmada’s tributaries in Madhya Pradesh and 
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Maharashtra.  Though proposals to build large dams on the Narmada inspired political controversy from the 
day the first proposals were made in 1947-48, only in the mid-1980s did the controversy take on the 
transnational aspects for which it is now famous as critics took up the cause of those who would be 
displaced as the reservoirs created by the dams filled up and raised environmental concerns about the 
project. 
 
Contentions over the planning or construction of large dams in developing countries provide some of the 
best documented examples of local stakeholders using transnational connections to secure greater 
influence in the domestic decision-making and implementing processes.  Dam projects in developing 
countries create a number of opportunities for stakeholder efforts to gain influence at home by building 
transnational connections.  No government finances a large dam project from current tax collections; these 
are large physical capital investments with costs beyond the ability of governments to finance from current 
taxes given all the other demands on the budget.  The governments of industrial countries can easily 
borrow the money they need for construction from private investors, but the governments of developing 
countries often find that difficult.  The World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
(sometimes also called international financial institutions or IFIs) were established to help developing 
countries secure loans by acting as an intermediary.  The MDBs are owned by the governments of member 
states, which pay in a certain amount of money (their “quota”) based on their current level of economic 
prosperity, meaning that the industrial state members pay in more money and hence own more shares – 
and have more votes on the board – than the developing country members.  The MDB uses the paid-in 
capital as the reserve against which it borrows money on private investment markets that it then re-lends to 
the developing country members.  Because of the industrial state backing and borrower promises to give 
the MDB priority in loan repayment, private investors are more willing to buy bonds issued by the MDB than 
bonds issued by an individual developing country.  This allows the MDB to charge borrowing countries 
lower interest rates than they would be able to secure on their own. 
 
The World Bank, the largest and most prominent of the MDBs, initially operated only in this fashion.  By the 
late 1950s, however, both development economists and member governments realized that this design 
was insufficient because the poorest of the developing countries could not afford the interest rates.  In 
response to proposals that the United Nations General Assembly establish a large Capital Development 
Fund financed through UN budget assessments on member states, the World Bank expanded its lending 
through establishment of the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960.  IDA would not sell 
bonds to private investors; rather, its industrial country members would provide money for re-lending to the 
developing members on terms significantly less costly than prevailed in private bond markets by charging 
approximately 0.5% interest on 30- to 45-year loans rather than a more standard private market rate of 6-
7% and 25-year loans. 
  
Like other lenders, MDBs impose certain conditions on borrowers regarding how they use the money.  
Each MDB has policy guidelines their staffs follow in identifying and selecting projects, recommending that 
the MDB make a loan, and monitoring use and repayment of the loan.  As long as the MDB can operate 
with its existing capital and the income it derives from loan payments, it is somewhat removed from the 
domestic politics of member states.  When, however, an MDB needs a new infusion of money, either to 
increase the reserve or to sustain a loan program financed by grants of money from the industrial country 
members, the question of financing can get caught up in the domestic politics of the member states 
providing the money.  This happened to the World Bank, which until 1993 was a major source of the loans 
supporting construction of the large dams on the Narmada River, because of the need for periodic 
replenishment of IDA funds. 
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In the mid-1980s a broad coalition of activists in the Western industrial countries supporting poor and 
marginalized groups in developing countries (such as urban slum dwellers, landless and other poor rural 
groups, indigenous peoples, disadvantaged ethnic or religious minorities) began a transnational Multilateral 
Development Banks Campaign intended to pressure the MDBs, particularly the World Bank, into adopting 
policies that would require paying greater attention to mitigating the negative socioeconomic and 
environmental impacts of projects being funded with MDB loans.  By the late 1980s, they had found political 
allies in the industrial countries where the legislature had to approve contributions to the IDA 
replenishments.  These connections were particularly strong in the USA, where the separation of power 
between the President and Congress allows congressional majorities to adopt policies even over 
presidential opposition, and the political culture was particularly open to private lobbying on behalf of 
causes as well as for direct material benefits.  This influence was institutionalized in the International 
Development and Finance Act of 1989, which included provisions requiring that: a) the US Treasury use 
US votes and influence in the MDBs to promote adoption of public access to the pre-lending environmental 
impact assessments developed by each in the process of considering loans, and b) the US Director to 
abstain from voting on a proposed loan if the environmental impact assessment relating to the project for 
which the loan is sought has not been released to the public at least 120 days before the date of the vote.1 
 
The US government also became the source of much current information the activists could not get from 
the World Bank itself because activists learned how to use the US Freedom of Information Act to secure it 
from the US Treasury Department, which houses the office of the US-appointed member of the World Bank 
executive board.  Campaigners developed a two-part approach: using their connections first to pressure the 
World Bank and other MDBs into adopting stronger social and environmental policies, and then to ensure 
that the MDBs required borrowing governments to conform to them.  Simultaneously, MDB Campaign 
activists worked to develop a more balanced transnational network by making connections with and 
providing support to citizen groups in developing countries active in social and environmental causes, an 
evolution also encouraged as members of the World Bank reacted against pressure from Western-based 
NGOs and coalitions by requiring that complaints addressed to the Inspection Panel established in 1994 be 
made by affected people within the territory of the borrowing country.2  
 
The Narmada River  
 
The Narmada River, the fifth longest in India, begins its 1312 km (813 mile) flow to the sea near the village 
of Amarkantak in Madhya Pradesh state. It flows through a relatively narrow basin defined on the north side 
by the Vindhaya Hills and on the south side by the Satpura Hills westward through Madhya Pradesh to a 
point where it becomes part of the boundary between Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.  35 km later it 
becomes part of the boundary between Maharashtra and Gujarat, and 39 km after that enters Gujarat for 
the last segment of its run to the Gulf of Khambat, which connects to the Arabian Sea.  Its origin point is 
                                                 
1Title V, International Development and Finance Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-240).  Text available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c101:6:./temp/~c101PKqVuC: (accessed 12 Aug. 2010).  The act followed a fine line: the provision for abstaining 
rather than voting against was meant as a signal to improve policy; it also avoided debates over whether member governments 
may tell MDB Directors how to vote on individual loans, an issue discussed in Bertram S. Brown 1992.  The United States and 
the Politicization of the World Bank: Issues of International Law and Policy (London and New York: K. Paul International), p. 236. 
 
2 David A. Wirth.  1998.  “Partnership Advocacy in World Bank environmental reform,” in Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, 
eds., The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge MA: MIT Press) p. 68. 
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1051 meters (3447 feet) above sea level.  Just west of Jabalpur it enters a deep channel faced by natural 
marble rocks 30 meters high on both sides, and then drops over the Dhaundhar Falls.  The river then 
descends slowly until it reaches the narrow gorge bound by high rocks lying along the state borders and 
extending into eastern Gujurat.  After leaving this gorge, the waters flow across flat plains to the sea.  Along 
the way the Narmada is augmented by waters from 41 tributaries – 22 on its southern side and 19 on its 
northern side.  Together the Narmada and its tributaries drain 98,796 sq km (37, 542 sq miles) of land.  
 
Like all of the other rivers in India the Narmada is an attractive resource for a country facing serious 
challenges in maintaining year-round water supply.  Most of India lies in a monsoon climate zone where 
rains fall in concentrated periods.  In some areas, half the annual rainfall occurs in less than 20 hours; rain 
is a bit more spread out in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, but is still concentrated in four months of the year: 
 
Average rainfall in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (mm)
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During the monsoon rains, India’s inhabitants must cope with deluges and heavy runoffs; during the rest of 
the year they draw their water from surface waters like lakes and rivers, from storage tanks, or from 
groundwater sources augmented by water traps that feed monsoon rains underground.  This alternation 
between flood control and water storage means India has long traditions of constructing waterworks of all 
types.  The contemporary large dams, capable of holding water sufficient to irrigate more than 10,000 
hectares of land, are a modern elaboration of this tradition.  Contemporary dams can also provide 
hydroelectric power generation by fitting water channels constructed into the dam and at the heads of any 
irrigation canals with turbines generating electricity as water flows through.  This increases the potential 
benefits and adds electricity providers and electricity users to the set of stakeholders. 
 
1947-1979:  Determining the Features of the Project 
 
Between the first suggestions for dams on the Narmada made in 1947-48 and the Award of the Narmada 
Water Disputes Tribunal in 1979, disputes about what to construct where, were arguments among three, 
and later four, state governments within India.  The governments of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Maharashta, later joined by the government of Rajasthan, argued about which state could build what size 
dam where, how the waters made available for irrigation would be divided among them, and what share of 
electricity generated by hydroelectric power plants built in conjunction with the dams would flow to each. 
 
Though the populations and economic situations of the states along the Narmada have changed over the 
decades, their primary concerns about the locations and sizes of dams and waterworks on the Narmada 
have remained constant: 
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State Concerns 
Gujarat primary: secure irrigation and drinking water to compensate for low rainfall 
secondary:  hydroelectric supply 
 
Madhya Pradesh primary: limit amount of water others are allowed to take 
secondary:  limit displacement of villages by downstream dam construction 
 
Maharasthra primary: secure hydroelectricity for its energy-short industrial districts 
secondary: limit displacement of villages by downstream dam construction 
 
Rajasthan secure irrigation waters for its dry southwestern districts 
 
 
 
Disputes between the states have been so protracted because of competing ideas about the height of the 
dam to be built at Navagam.  Gujarat favored a higher dam to maximize water supply, but it would flood out 
a much larger area, extending further into Madhya Pradesh and Maharastha, than the lower dam preferred 
by the latter two states.  When it became involved later, Rajasthan also preferred building a higher dam 
because that was the only way it would get any Narmada water. 
 
The Constitution of India defines construction and maintenance of water development projects as a matter 
within the authority of the state governments.  It also provides that the central government can step in to 
help resolve disputes regarding projects that would affect the flow of a river crossing state boundaries.3  
That was the basis for the central government's involvement in the lengthy dispute among Gujarat, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Maharashtra.  Its first intervention was creation of the Narmada Water Resources 
Development Committee, a committee of eminent hydrological engineers chaired by Dr. A. N. Khosla.  
Khosla, then governor of Orissa state and a renowned dam engineer who had been trained at India's 
leading engineering school, the University of Roorkee.  He and the other engineers on the committee were 
instructed to help the three states resolve their disputes by developing a master plan for optimum 
development.4  They were particularly asked to examine the siting and height of the proposed dam at 
Navagam in relation to alternative projects, mainly hydroelectric dams, that Madhya Pradesh wanted to 
build because their feasibility depended on the extent of the reservoir created behind any dam at Navagam.  
The committee ultimately recommended in favor of the relatively high dam preferred by Gujarat, in part 
because it would allow extending irrigation systems into the dryer districts of Rajasthan and Gujarat, areas 
then prominent in politicians’ and officials’ minds because Pakistani troops had intruded into India during 
April 1965 through one of the dryer parts of Gujarat.  Though the Khosla Committee's report was ultimately 
rejected, it shaped later discussion by considering the Narmada and its tributaries as one system and 
arguing for a "national approach" to water resources that would justify extending irrigation canals to areas 
outside the Narmada basin.  
 
                                                 
3 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, II:7 and I: 56, and Article 262. 
 
4 Government of India, Ministry of Irrigation and Power.  1965.  Report of the Narmada Water Resources Development 
Committee (A.N. Khosla, chair).  Cuttack: Orissa Government Press. 
 
6
Case Summary 
 
A combination of failure to resolve the dispute by direct discussions among the state governments involved 
and serious drought in western India caused by failure of the monsoons in 1965-66 and 1968-1969 led 
Gujarat, where the drought was particularly severe, to ask for central government involvement.  It formally 
invoked the Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1956 and asked the central government to form a water 
disputes tribunal to settle the contentions over Narmada projects.  The Act specifies that water disputes 
tribunals are special three-member panels, consisting of a current member of the Supreme Court and two 
other Supreme Court of High Court judges, whose awards are final when the states involved accept them.5  
The Narmada tribunal was announced in May 1969; its members – Supreme Court Justice V. Ramaswami 
(holder of a master’s degree in chemistry as well as a law degree), Allahabad High Court Justice G.C. 
Mathur and retired chief justice of Kerala V.P. Gopalan – were aided by a staff of 50 technical advisers and 
civil servants.  The need to address various procedural challenges, mostly from Madhya Pradesh, meant it 
did not start considering the substantive issues until February 1972.  After another delay inspired by Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi’s efforts to mediate the dispute, the Tribunal resumed work in August 1974.  
Between 1974 and December 1979 when it issued its report, the Tribunal held no public hearings or other 
consultations with any stakeholders (including politicians from the disputing states); such procedures were 
not the norm in India at the time and no one raised the issue.  Rather, it operated like court, with the states 
presenting their arguments through lawyers, examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses, and 
visits to various sites along the Narmada in the company of their technical experts. 
 
The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award (NWDT Award) set out a plan for construction of 30 major 
dams, 125 medium dams, and 3000 small dams at various locations on the Narmada or its 41 tributary 
rivers plus a 532 km (329 mile) canal from the reservoir that would be created by the dam at Navagam 
through Gujarat and into Rajasthan.  It accepted construction of a high large dam at Navargam, as Gujarat 
proposed, but determined that it should be 455 feet (138.7 meters) high rather than the 530 feet (162 
meters) urged by Gujarat.  Other terms of the Tribunal's Award reflected efforts to balance benefits and 
costs among the four participating states.  Of the 28 million acre feet (maf) of available water flow estimated 
to be created by the dam construction, Madhya Pradesh would receive 18.25 maf (65.2%); Gujarat, 9 maf 
(32.2%); Rajasthan, 0.5 maf (1.7%); and Maharashtra, 0.25 maf (0.9%).  The estimated hydroelectric 
production would be divided on the formula of 57% to Madhya Pradesh, 27% to Maharashtra, and 16% to 
Gujarat.  Though on hydrological calculations four fifths of the Narmada's flow is within Madhya Pradesh, 
Gujarat was allocated a somewhat larger than proportional share of water on grounds that it needed water 
much more than Madhya Pradesh or Maharasthra because they can also draw on other rivers whereas 
Gujarat only had the Narmada.  Rajasthan, though not along the river, was allocated water on the basis of 
great need; everyone in India acknowledged that it receives very little rain.  Madhya Pradesh and 
Maharashtra were given larger shares of electricity than their current populations might suggest to make up 
for the fact that the height of the dam at Navargam would prevent them from building their proposed 
Jalsindhi hydroelectric dam because the area would be flooded by the reservoir created by the Navagam 
dam.6 
                                                 
5 Inter State Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 6 (Publication of Decision of Tribunal) subsection 1 (subsection 2 incorporates the 
2002 amendment).  Text available at http://mowr.gov.in/index3.asp?sslid=385&subsublinkid=377&langid=1 (accessed 11 August 
2010). 
 
6Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal. 1979. Report of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal with its Decision.  5 vols.  New Delhi: 
Controller of Publications.  The shorter terms of the Award, dated 7 December 1979, and published in the Official Gazette on 12 
December 1979 are available at http://nca.gov.in/forms_pdf/nwdt_finalorder.pdf (accessed 29 July 2010) and reproduced in 
Appendix 2. 
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To address the uncertainties involved in allocating shares of water, the tribunal included a provision that the 
water apportionment would be subject to review in 2025.  This would be 45 years after 1980—a baseline 
picked because the tribunal expected that construction of the 3 largest dams of Madhya Pradesh’s portion 
of the Narmada Project (Indira Sagar, a combined irrigation and hydroelectric dam 319 km or 198 miles 
upstream from Navagam; Omkareshwar, with a smaller irrigation reservoir plus hydroelectric capacity; and 
Maheswar, a hydroelectric flow-through dam) to begin before the end of that year.  The review would permit 
addressing any changes in river flow caused by the climate or the hydrology of the basin and in user needs 
stemming from demographic changes in the four states.  The 45 years would also provide time to assess 
the performance of the whole interconnected system of dams and canals and take that into account as well. 
 
Detailed design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Narmada River system would be 
undertaken by the state governments, each on its own stretch of the river.  Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh 
established public corporations for this purpose: Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited (SSNNL) in 
Gujarat and the Narmada Valley Development Authority (NVDA) in Madhya Pradesh.  The fact the river 
flows between states provided the legal basis for the tribunal's decision to set up the Narmada Control 
Authority, employing both government of India and state engineers and civil servants to coordinate and 
monitor finance, construction, and resettlement of people whose homes would be flooded by the reservoirs 
(“oustees”).  The central government also had some control over the details of the projects through the 
Central Water and Power Commission, the Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests, each of which had authority to grant or withhold clearance for proceeding with various aspects of 
project construction. 
 
The NWDT Award did not end all the argument – Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh continued to disagree 
about the height of the dam to be built at Navagam, now named the Sardar Sarovar Dam, and hence the 
size of the reservoir to be created.  However, those arguments were soon overshadowed by controversies 
over treatment of the oustees and environmental impacts of the whole Narmada River project. 
 
1980-2000 Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
 
The environmental issues were fought out under the terms of the Forest Conservation Act 1980, which 
gave the central government’s Department of Environment (later the Ministry of Environment and Forests) 
uthority to require environmental impact assessment of development projects and withhold clearance to 
begin construction until the terms of the Forest Conservation Act were satisfied.  The Department used its 
authority to order both Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh to do four things before they could begin their 
respective dam projects on the Narmada: 1) prepare alternate forest sites to compensate for forests that 
would be submerged behind the dams, 2) improve the terms of resettlement aid offered to people who 
would be displaced from their homes, 3) create wildlife sanctuaries, and 4) prepare both the catchment and 
command areas of each dam for that dam’s environmental effects.7  In 1983, when Gujarat submitted the 
Sardar Sarovar Dam plans and Madhya Pradesh submitted the Narmada Sagar Dam plans the ministry 
decided that neither state had met the requirements and refused to give clearance.  The ministry did not 
budge until 1987, after several years of drought in Gujarat had created extremely strong pressure to let 
construction of Sardar Sarovar begin.  By then, however, private nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
                                                 
7 The catchment area is all the land where rainfall and other surface waters are drained by a river or stream; the command area 
is all the land irrigated by waters from reservoir, tank, or canal. 
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working with and advocating for the rural poor were well organized.  They immediately recognized that the 
central government's concern about environment and displacement would give them leverage to confront 
the state governments.  The state governments were perceived, with good reason, as more concerned to 
get the projects built than with what happened to the oustees, many of who were poor and illiterate adivasi 
(members of Scheduled Tribes still living by their traditional culture). 
 
While the environmental issues were fought out within the terms of India’s environmental legislation and 
permitting processes, issues relating to “rehabilitation and resettlement” of oustees were fought out on 
terms deriving from the NWDT Award.  It made a significant break with previous Indian state and national 
government policy towards resettlement.  Prior to the NWDT Award, the central and state governments 
followed rules first established in the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (adopted during British rule) that the people 
who lose their homes in the course of dam construction are to be given cash compensation.  In fact, 
oustees were often simply expelled and many of those who received a payment ended up becoming 
landless rural laborers or urban slum dwellers because they were illiterate or unsophisticated; many were 
fleeced in phony land deals and other spent the money foolishly.   
 
Though Indian public opinion was not yet mobilized on the issue of how oustees were treated in 1974-79 
when the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal was pursuing its inquiries and preparing its findings, its three 
members were aware of earlier problems.  They acknowledged that oustees would bear a heavy burden for 
the project and deserved decent recompense.  The NWDT Award sought to avert earlier problems by 
stipulating explicitly that compensation should be "land for land" rather than money: each displaced family 
is to receive land of its choice within the command area of the dam displacing them equivalent in area to 
what they were losing, or at minimum 2 hectares (4.94 acres).  Each male 18 years or older is to be treated 
as the head of a separate family and allocated land.  The initial terms of the Award suggested that 
compensation would be provided only for those who held legal title to their land; activists later pressured 
the Gujarat state government into extending the program to landless people and to “encroachers” (people 
who had simply set up their houses on government-owned land).  The tribunal award required each of the 
participating states to prepare its own package of resettlement and rehabilitation benefits, but Gujarat was 
also required to offer the same benefits to oustees of the Sardar Sarovar from Madhya Pradesh and 
Maharashtra if they opted to move to Gujarat as the Tribunal balanced the burden of providing for 
resettlement with the benefit of the greater water supply Gujarat would secure from the high Sardar Sarovar 
dam.  The NWDT Award specified that each resettled family should get a housing plot as well as farmland, 
and monetary grants in aid to cover the cost of moving, buying farm implements and draft animals, and 
insurance.  It also specified that resettlement villages should be provided with a primary school, a 
panchayat (village government council) meeting hall, a medical dispensary, a seed store, a children's 
playground, a drinking water well, a village pond, and a link road.  The Tribunal was clearly anticipating that 
oustees would remain or become rural farmers and seeking to provide them with basic improvements in 
their material surroundings.  The Award did not make any distinction between adivasis and others among 
the oustees, even though several Indian laws do treat adivasis as a distinct category and provide them with 
certain legal protections for maintenance of their traditional communal ways of life.  Some two thirds of the 
oustees from the Sardar Sarovar Dam were adivasis, and they became the centerpiece of the controversy 
over oustee resettlement. 
 
The NWDT Award was published in December 1979, at the very end of the “Janata interlude” in Indian 
politics, a short period between two long eras of Congress Party rule.  The Congress Party, which had been 
in power continuously since independence in 1947, lost the spring 1977 parliamentary elections in a 
popular rebuke of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's suspension of many civil liberties during Emergency Rule 
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in 1975-77.  However, the coalition that supplanted it was wracked by internal disagreements and soon 
faced strikes and other civil strife.  This enabled the Congress factions forming Indira Gandhi's new 
Congress (I) party to win the next election and return to power in January 1980.  A significant number of 
younger Indians who had become alienated from conventional politics during and after Emergency Rule 
began to channel their idealism into volunteer activism and work with NGOs.  This new generation did not 
have any direct experience of the pre-1947 nationalist movement, but draw on the same extensive Indian 
repertoire of civil disobedience actions though adopting ideological stances ranging across socialism, the 
Gandhian tradition of nonviolence, humanist ideals, and feminism.  Yet, whatever their disagreements all of 
the activists were committed to fighting for social justice through grassroots organization, public education, 
and organized political protest.  Much of their discussion was framed in terms of rights:  rights to equality, 
rights to dignity, rights to be consulted, rights to be free from exploitation, and rights of both future and 
present generations to an undamaged environment.  All of these claims are resonated with those of other 
groups in other countries who were also seeking alternatives to the existing political, economic, and social 
order.  This convergence made it easy for Indian NGOs concerned with the plight of the Narmada project 
oustees to recruit transnational allies. 
 
By the late 1980s, India was home to one of the most vibrant collection of local civil society organizations 
and grassroots activism in the world.  As John R. Wood observed: 
 
It is a matter of considerable debate as to whether the proliferation of NGOs in the 1980s, and into 
the 1990s and beyond, reflected a failure of India's political system, or rather its success.  On the 
one hand, NGOs were taking up responsibilities that were originally thought to belong to the 
government and which the latter, for reasons of sloth, corruption or unwillingness to disturb the 
status quo, had clearly failed to fulfill.  On the other hand, the vigorous voluntarism, outspokenness 
and self-sacrifice of many NGO activists could only have emerged in an open political system that 
encouraged democratic participation and valued rights and freedoms.  Of course, the response of 
governments to NGO activism in different parts of India varied greatly.  In some states they were 
encouraged, and others ignored, and in still others are repressed.  Among and within the NGOs 
also there was considerable disagreement -- between those activists who wanted to cooperate with 
government officials, enlist their support and convert them to new thinking, versus those who saw 
government officials as the main enemy, whose policies and projects calls the injustices that NGOs 
must fight.8 
 
All of these features of Indian politics and the NGO and voluntary association scene were prominent in the 
long campaigns waged against either the Narmada Project in general or the Sardar Sarovar Dam in 
particular.  
 
The voluntary associations, NGOs, and community action groups took up the cause of the oustees first 
became active in Gujarat.  Initial organizing was assisted by activists in Lokayan, an organization founded 
by social scientists at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi seeking to link 
researchers with activists policy makers and ordinary citizens affected by development projects.  The 
Lokayan branch in Ahmedabad, Gujarat was particularly active and other Ahmedabad activists began 
criticizing the resettlement provisions of the NWDT Award soon after its publication.  The Center for Social 
                                                 
8 John R. Wood.  2007.  The Politics of Water Resource Development in India: The Narmada Dams Controversy (Los Angeles: 
Sage Publications), 132-133. 
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Knowledge and Action (SETU in its Gujarati acronym), intended to build leadership within marginalized 
communities so they could carry out their own struggles, was founded in 1982 and soon began working on 
oustee issues.  The Center for Social Studies in Surat got involved in 1981 when the Gujarat government 
gave it a contract to monitor the condition of 19 Gujarati villages whose inhabitants would be displaced by 
the Sardar Sarovar reservoir.  The contract was expanded in 1984 to cover all resettlement and 
rehabilitation for all Gujarati oustees.  The surveys done by Center sociologists revealed that the social 
problems caused by relocation were much larger than anticipated.  It was Center researchers who 
discovered that many of the oustees were encroachers lacking title to the land they occupied.  They also 
realized that a majority of the Gujarati oustees were adivasi familiar only with sustaining themselves by 
fishing, hunting, and gathering plant foods in a forest environment.  The Center researchers wondered how 
they would manage to convert from their largely non-monetized economy in the hills to the modern 
agriculture envisioned for resettlement.  They were also concerned about finding enough land to permit the 
adivasi oustees to move as a village unit so that hamlets of kin groups could be kept intact.  By then 
several organizations were involved in providing services to adivasi villages so were very familiar with 
conditions on the ground. 
 
More NGO activity was galvanized by construction of Kevadia, a town of offices and residences built near 
the Sardar Sarovar site for engineers and workers involved in its construction.  Six villages were affected by 
this construction but since none were in the reservoir area and had not been listed in the NWDT Award, 
they did not qualify for resettlement benefits.  The contractors building the town sometimes paid 
compensation to villagers but more often pressured them into accepting token compensation through 
agreements they could not read.  Their cause was taken up by Lok Adhikar Sangh (Association for 
People’s Authority) a civic organization specializing in legal assistance to the poor.  It was able to get the 
Indian Supreme Court to issue a stay order stopping construction while court-appointed investigators 
determined how the oustees were being treated.  This inquiry revealed massive irregularities and prodded 
the Gujarat government into realizing that it needed to follow proper expropriation procedures in all project-
related construction activity.  Two other organizations, Action Research in Community Health and 
Development (ARCH) and Vahini (short for Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini or Student Your Struggle 
Force), already engaged in providing social services in adivasi communities, combined their efforts to 
campaign on the villagers’ and dam oustees’ behalf.  A third, the Centre for Social Knowledge and Action 
(known by its Gujarati acronym as SETU), was formed in 1982 to provide marginalized groups with training 
and assistance for self-mobilization. 
 
Though the NGOs and other activists were often in conflict with Gujarat government officials, the conflict 
did not get too intense for several reasons.  First, many of the NGOs followed the Gandhian approach to 
social service and employed only nonviolent opposition methods.  This gave them and their cause 
legitimacy in Gujarat politics and the government was careful to avoid actions that would make it look bad.  
The longer-established NGOs had political and bureaucratic contacts in the government, and several senior 
government officials were sympathetic to the demands they were putting forward.  These officials realized 
fairly soon that they did not have the administrative capacity needed for relocating thousands of people and 
needed the NGOs’ assistance to avert a social disaster.  Finally, the NGOs realized that securing water 
supply was so important to everyone in Gujarat that all-out opposition to Sardar Sarovar would weaken 
support for the oustees. 
 
These early interactions meant that Gujarat was far more prepared to resettle people of the 19 villages it 
was required to move under the NWDT Award then Madhya Pradesh was to move the people of its 33 
listed villages or Maharashtra to move the people of its 193.  NGOs were not active in either state and the 
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governments did not appear to be getting ready to deal with the problem.  This inspired considerable 
concern within the Gujarati NGOs who understood the dimensions of the problem and SETU in particular 
began to expand its activity into Madhya Pradesh. 
 
The politics of resettlement intensified in Gujarat in March 1984 when massive rallies of villagers from the 
19 affected villages got enough publicity to come to the attention not only of the government but also of 
international aid groups including Oxfam and the World Bank.  Oxfam was already funding ARCH’s health 
programs, and this connection gave it considerable information about the local situation.  The protests also 
attracted notice of World Bank officials who were then negotiating the terms of $450 million a startup loan 
for the Sardar Sarovar Dam.  During the project assessment phase of considering the loan, the World Bank 
sent Professor Thayer Scudder, an anthropologist at the California Technical Institute (Caltech) with 
considerable expertise on involuntary resettlement, to assess the resettlement provisions.  Scudder's report 
confirmed most of the Gujarati NGOs’ complaints about the inadequacies of the tribunal resettlement 
provisions and became an important weapon in ARCH-Vahini’s battle with the Gujarat government.  
Officials at SSNNL quickly realized that ARCH-Vahini and the oustees could cause a delay in securing the 
World Bank loan and thereby slow the project.  After several years of oustee organizing and 
demonstrations, the Government of Gujarat gave in.  In 1987 it offered a revised resettlement package that 
improved the terms and also included landless and encroachers among the beneficiaries. 
 
Meanwhile the NGO coalition was splitting.  ARCH-Vahini was following a pragmatic strategy of combining 
constant pressure, implied threats of mass unrest, and willingness to cooperate with the government if it 
made significant concessions.  Its leaders regarded this as the only strategy that made sense in Gujarat 
where the urgent demand for water meant there was broad popular support for completing the dam as 
quickly as possible.  The 1987 revised resettlement agreement looked very good on paper; now according 
to ARCH-Vahini, the task was to make sure that it was fully implemented.  Others rejected the ARCH-
Vahini approach as too timid.  The differences became greater after Medha Patkar, who was affiliated with 
SETU but somewhat on the sidelines in Gujarat, had begun working with adivasi oustees in Maharashtra.    
Organizers from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) were already in the villages, and competing 
effectively with them required her to advance more radical views than prevailed among the Gujarati groups.  
She attributed her decision to oppose the entire project to a combination of greater awareness of the 
environmental problems it was causing, belief that the Forest Conservation Act 1980 would restrict the 
ability to resettle oustee adivasi on forest land, and belief that the project should not have gone forward 
until after full public consultation with those who would be affected.  She became the central figure in the 
Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement), which was formed in Maharashtra in 1989 and 
later spread to include 150 affiliates in other parts of India and organizations of supporters abroad. 
 
Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) organized village committees in the areas of Madhya Pradesh and 
Maharashtra that would be affected by Sardar Sarovar and other dams on the Narmada, and succeeded in 
maintaining a coalition between adivasis in Maharasthra and western Madhya Pradesh and members of the 
landowning Patidar caste in the plains.  It registered its opposition to the Narmada Project on human rights 
and environmental grounds and staged a series of demonstrations, road blockades, and sit-ins against its 
continuation.  The NBA’s success at getting Prime Minister V.P. Singh to agree to reconsider the Narmada 
Project in March 1990 sparked a fierce counter-reaction in Gujarat, where state government officials and 
newly formed pro-Project civic organizations mobilized to support construction.  January 1991 was marked 
by a 21-day confrontation between some 5000 NBA activists and supporters on one side and Gujarat police 
plus thousands of pro-dam demonstrators on the other at Ferkuva on the Gujarat-Madhya Pradesh border, 
where the NBA group had been stopped before they could reach the Sardar Sarovar site.  Baba Amte, a 
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Gandhian social worker greatly respected everywhere in India for his longtime work with lepers, set the 
stage for an extended confrontation by announcing a “dharna (fasting sit-in) unto death” on the 5th.  Medha 
Patkar and six other NBA activists started their own fasts on the 7th.  Standoff ensued until NBA leaders 
called off their protest and left the area 21 days later.  NBA then began a noncooperation campaign in the 
Narmada Valley involving refusal to pay taxes and blocking entry to all government officials except teachers 
and doctors.  As Narmada waters backed up behind the partly constructed Sardar Sarovar Dam and 
threatened Manibeli village in Maharashtra, NBA also organized a confrontation between villagers who did 
not want to move and police sent to clear the village. 
 
NBA initially refused to accept foreign funding, because doing so would open it to one of the most common 
charges in Indian politics: that it is the agent of outside powers.9  However, it did garner international media 
attention, an invitation to testify at a US Congressional hearing,10 and the Right Livelihood Award from the 
Swedish Right Livelihood Foundation.  In the early 1990s, it also had tacit support from the Madhya 
Pradesh and Maharasthra governments because its opposition to dam construction dovetailed with their 
concerns about the ultimate height of the Sardar Sarovar Dam and succeeded in triggering debate all 
around India about the social and environmental impacts of the Narmada River Project and large dams 
more generally. 
 
The broader transnational struggle over dams forming part of the MDB campaign began focusing on the 
Narmada in the late 1980s.  By 1989, campaigners were demanding that the World Bank, which was 
considering additional loans for the Sardar Sarovar Project -- $350 million for canal construction and $90 
million for environmental measures – either force modification of or refuse to support the project.  
Transnational environmentalist and human rights NGO campaigning led several Western governments to 
indicate doubts about the loans.  In response, the World Bank commissioned an Independent Review of 
Indian and state government implementation of the resettlement and environmental mitigation aspects of 
the Sardar Sarovar Project.  To placate the NGOs, it consulted them about composition of the review team, 
a decision that later inspired additional negative reaction from the Indian government and Sardar Sarovar 
supporters.  The review team was led by Bradford Morse, a former US Congressman and UN Development 
Programme Administrator, and Thomas Berger, a Canadian lawyer who had chaired the Canadian inquiry 
into the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Project and given strong support to indigenous peoples’ rights, and 
included a group of mainly Canadian engineers, environmental planners and indigenous rights experts.  In 
June 1992 after 10 months of inquiry, it issued a 363-page report criticizing the project for failure to: 
 
a) include adequate assessment of the human impact of Sardar Sarovar Dam,  
b) involve any consultation with those who would be affected,  
c) consider the character of adivasi culture in working out resettlement plans,  
d) provide adequate additional resettlement when the height of the dam was increased,  
e) pay sufficient attention to environmental factors in the initial project design, and  
f) comply with the stipulations included in the conditional clearance issued by the Indian Ministry 
of Environment and Forests in 1987.11   
                                                 
9 Such charges are frequently raised against others in a debate, regardless of their place on the left-right ideological spectrum, 
as exemplified below in discussion of the controversy over World Bank funding. 
 
10 US House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.  1989.  Sardar Sarovar Dam Project: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, and the Environment.  101st Congress, 1st Session. 
 
11 Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review.  1992.  Ottawa: Resource Futures International. 
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The Independent Review Report recommended that the World Bank suspend the loans until the 
Governments of India and of the states involved complied with the standards for resettlement and 
environmental protection that they had themselves adopted or accepted.  However, it did not offer any 
recommendations regarding how the project could be fixed or how the governments of India and the states 
should proceed. 
 
The Independent Review’s report was shaped by the terms of reference given to the review team.  It was 
asked to assess resettlement and environmental issues, not to offer alternative project designs.  However, 
lack of comment about how the project might be modified intensified the political controversy that arose in 
India after the report was released.  The Gujarat and Indian governments both reacted angrily to what they 
regarded as a “partisan” and unfair report, and were additionally perturbed that NGO activists were able to 
get copies faxed to them by foreign supporters before the government received its copy from the World 
Bank.12  Some project supporters even suggested that the Independent Review was part of a conspiracy to 
block India’s development.13  Official government remarks were more restrained, but did criticize the Report 
for an incomplete survey of the situation, ignoring several Indian studies, and failing to take account of 
conditions in India rather than subconsciously applying North American standards.  ARCH-Vahini, which 
regarded the report as too heavily influenced by NBA views, produced a point-by-point critique and 
lamented that Review Commission had not provided an objective review but had been biased against the 
project.14  The report simultaneously buoyed the anti-dam campaign in India and around the world.  NBA 
increased its pressure against the whole Narmada Project by demanding that the World Bank withhold the 
loans and that India stop construction of Sardar Sarovar, calling on supporters to undertake “direct action” if 
the Bank did not announce a withholding by July 15th, and condemning the World Bank for promoting neo-
colonialism through its financing of the Project.15 
 
The World Bank Initially reacted by indicating continued support for the loans and sending a staff team to 
India to reappraise the resettlement program and environmental concerns and report directly to the World 
Bank’s Executive Board.  Its report, released by the Bank in September, rejected several of the 
Independent Review’s conclusions but did agree with the Independent Review on the need to improve 
resettlement provisions and said that Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra should offer the same 
resettlement aid as Gujarat.16 
 
The World Bank faced strong pressures on both sides.  There were several reasons to approve the loans: 
the project was underway, it was clear that the governments of India and the states involved wanted it to 
happen, and some Gujarat officials were saying openly that the loans amounted to only 10% of the total 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 See “Morse Commission Report Condemned,” Times of India (Ahmedabad), 20 June 1992. 
  
13 “Morse Commission report condemned,” Hindustan Times, 24 June 1992. 
 
14 Anil Patel and Ambrish Mehta.  1997.  The Independent Review: Was it a search for truth?” in William Fisher, ed., Toward 
Sustainable Development: Struggling over the Narmada River (Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat Publications), 381-417. 
 
15Call by NBA leader Mehda Patkar, as reported in “3 CMs to meet on Narmada,” Times of India (Ahmedabad)  2 July 1992. 
 
16Terms summarized in World Bank.  1995.  Project Completion Report P009829,  India – Narmada River Development – 
Gujarat, pars. 6.11 (p. 27) and 7.39 (p. 45).  Available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/03/29/000009265_3980625173028/Rendered/PDF/multi
_page.pdf (accessed 11 August 2010). 
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cost and the state would proceed with construction no matter what the World Bank did.  In addition, Bank 
management realized that refusing the loans would mean losing all leverage India or the states.  Yet, there 
were reasons to deny.  Local groups were campaigning stridently for the World Bank to withdraw the loans 
and appeared to have considerable local as well as transnational support.  Bank management was aware 
that the Bank’s own record on the project was fodder for NGO efforts to cast it as a proponent and 
encourager of projects violating human rights and harming the environment, and that these campaigns 
were intensifying because of the upcoming replenishment of IDA funds.  European campaigners persuaded 
the Swedish and European Parliaments to recommend that European Community (now European Union) 
member governments use their votes in the Bank Executive Board to stop the loans.  Japanese groups 
organized an International Narmada Symposium in Tokyo, which inspired 20 members of the Japanese 
Diet (parliament) to demand the World Bank and the Japanese government (which was a co-financier) to 
cancel their loans.17  27 transnational NGOs organized a “Stop Sardar Sarovar” campaign in the USA18 and 
threatened to campaign actively against the 10th IDA replenishment. 
 
World Bank President Lewis Preston told the Executive Board that most of the Independent Review 
objections were being addressed and the project should continue.  Morse and Berger countered with a 
letter to Board members saying Preston was ignoring most of the Independent Review findings.  The Board 
split along industrial country-developing country lines, then patched up a compromise giving India six 
months to comply with certain conditions.  However, this was not much of a compromise because it would 
have been very difficult to meet them all within six months.  The political embarrassment of having to 
accept such publicly stated and detailed outside conditions was more than the Indian government was 
willing to accept.  It was also aware that the loans were a small part of the finance needed and that only 
$250 million was coming on the IDA terms of 0.5% a year with repayment over 45 years; the other $170 
million would carry more standard terms of 7 percent with repayment over 25 years.19  The governments of 
India and of the three states resolved to move ahead without World Bank loans.20 
 
This affected the political balance in a number of ways.  ARCH-Vahini lost influence among adivasi, now 
fired up by NBA.  It also lost leverage over the government of Gujarat because it would not be able to use 
the World Bank as a prod.  NBA built on the prestige gained by having “chased away” the World Bank to 
expand its work and found a new organization, National Alliance of People’s Movements, to amalgamate all 
opponents of the project into one group.  It also upped its political demands by calling for complete removal 
of the existing 61- meter high Sardar Sarovar Dam and urging all supporters to engage in jal samarpan 
(“self-sacrifice by water”) by refusing to move as flood waters covered their dwellings during the monsoon 
season already underway.  Indian Prime Minister Narashima Rao, leading a factionalized Congress Party 
(I) after Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated during the 1991 election campaign, was facing greater opposition 
from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was actively stoking Hindu nationalism.  This helped Gujarat, 
                                                 
 
17 Wirth 1998, p. 63. 
 
18 See full page ads in the New York Times, 21 September 1992, the Financial Times 21 September 1992, p. 6, and the 
Washington Post, 21 September 1992,. 
 
19Loan terms noted in “World Bank and Narmada Project,” India Abroad, 16 April 1993. 
 
20 Stefan Wagstyl 1993.  “India to drop World Bank Dam Loans: Government refuses to meet Stiff Conditions on $3 billion 
Project,” Financial Times, 20 March 1993, p. 6. 
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where the BJP mobilization was threatening to cut into Congress Party support.  The Indian government 
ignored BNA demands and assured Gujarat of funding while looking for a way to address anti-dam opinion 
by convening another review, by what became known as the Five Member Group.  However, its terms of 
reference were limited to “reappraising the project, and the state government of Gujarat further limited its 
activities by refusing to allow it to visit sites within the state.  Continued disagreements, including a call by 
the new first minister in Madhya Pradesh for lowering the final dam height from 455 to 463 feet to exclude 
67 villages and 38,000 people from the reservoir area,21 created further uncertainty. 
 
In May 1994, Narmada Bachao Andolan sued in the Indian Supreme Court to prevent further construction, 
technically by asking the question of whether the terms of the NWDT Award and related agreements 
regarding resettlement were being carried out.22  It responded in January 1995 with a stay order restricting 
construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam to the already-attained 80.5 meter (263.3 feet) height for five years 
to provide additional time for resettling oustees.  During this period work did continue on the hydroelectric 
powerhouse, located – meters downstream of the dam, and the irrigation canal that would supply water to 
dry parts of Gujarat and Rajasthan.  At the same time, discussions about dam projects in India and around 
the world were redefining the contention. 
 
Debates about Technology Choice 
 
As political instability swept the center, and politics in the states was also affected by the strong Congress-
BJP competition that led to 4 parliamentary elections between 1996 and 1999 when a BJP-led coalition 
was able to secure a comfortable majority.  Indian courts, particularly the Supreme Court, became more 
active on social and economic justice by encouraging class action suits on social and economic questions.  
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court’s rulings on social issues were admired by social and economic justice 
advocates tired of seeing the politicians ignore them but criticized by others who thought the courts were 
being overambitious, litigation delays lengthening, and some courts losing the reputation for impartiality and 
integrity on which their authority rested. 
 
Globally, the concerns about dams were reframed by adoption of the notion of “sustainable development.”   
Though vague and attracting detractors, the concept was used to organize discussions where proponents 
and opponents of large infrastructure projects found ways to talk despite their often diametrically opposed 
preferences. 
 
The most notable change at the international level was expressed in the meetings and report of the World 
Commission on Dams.  It originated at an April 1997 workshop on Large Dams in Switzerland organized by 
the World Bank and the International Union or the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) where participants drawn 
from 18 countries and having opinions across the spectrum attempted to develop consensus on “whether 
dams have a role to play in land, water, and energy development and how particular dams should be 
designed, constructed, and operated.”23  The workshop led to appointment of a World Commission on 
                                                 
21 The Madhya Pradesh government acknowledged that this would lower the hydroelectric potential, and agreed to forego its 
share of the electric power, while arguing that Gujarat could still meet its water needs with the lower dam.  
 
22 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition (C) No. 319 of 1994. 
23 IUCN-The World Conservation Union and the World Bank Group.  1997.  Large Dams: Learning from the Past, Looking to the 
Future: Workshop Proceedings.  Gland Switzerland: IUCN and Washington: The World Bank Group. 
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Dams, which produced a report circulated on the Internet and on CD-ROM.24  Indian participants were 
prominently involved.  NBA leader Medha Patkar and former India Planning Commission member L.C. Jain 
were 2 of the 12 members of the Commission, and the government of India was invited to contribute a 
country report about its experiences with large dam projects.  The Commission concluded that many large 
dam projects undertaken in the past were not viable but that dam building could be improved to cause less 
suffering by people living in river valleys and minimize negative environmental impacts.  Thus, the 
Commission came into line with emerging development thinking placing greater stress on sustainability, 
choice of technology attuned to local conditions, and the need for greater consultation and reliance on 
“bottom-up” processes of project definition. 
 
Contentions over dams spread to Madhya Pradesh in 1997 when that state began work on the dams at 
Bargi, Mann, and Maheshwar.  When the private Indian firm S. Kumars Ltd. began work on the dam at 
Maheshwar, local residents opposing the dam and NBA activists pressured the Madhra Pradesh 
government into suspending construction and undertaking an additional investigation of the dam’s likely 
impact.  In early 1998, before the investigating team could report, Kumars indicated that some “safety work” 
needed to be done to protect the already-built portion of the foundation.  The government accepted the 
argument and allowed Kumars to go ahead.  The NBA saw the move as a way to re-start construction and 
mobilized members to demonstrate at the site.  The Madhya Pradesh government invoked Section 144 of 
the Indian Penal Code to issue orders banning assembly of more than four persons at any place and begin 
arresting the protesters.  NBA believed that 76% of the project costs would be covered by foreign investors 
in the project and was able to use its transnational supporters to deter a number of foreign corporations 
from becoming involved. 
 
However, NBA’s continuing resistance to any dam construction was beginning to get out of phase with 
Indian opinion.  This became more obvious in the summer of 1999 when novelist Arundhati Roy, well 
known after her The God of Small Things won the Booker Prize in the UK, wrote a series of essays on the 
Sardar Sarovar Project.  These emphasized the suffering of the oustees in eloquent terms but paid no 
attention to the water management issues.  Their publication coincided with the second year of failed 
monsoons and severe drought in Gujarat, and they became the target of criticism by others – and even of 
public burning during pro-dam demonstrations in Ahmedabad.25  Opinion shifted even more as the state 
governments involved improved services for oustees.  Gujarat offered to provide the same financial aid to 
Sardar Sarovar oustees in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra who wanted to settle near their original 
homes rather than move to Gujarat.  Gujarat also established a special Grievance Redressal Authority 
(GRA) for Sardar Sarovar Affected Persons giving oustees who had moved to new homes in Gujarat a 
place to go to get complaints resolved as the resettlement process moved forward.  Its head, former High 
Court Judge P.D. Desai, secured strong guarantees of autonomy from the Gujarat government and 
instituted processes through which the GRA simplified procedures and worked mainly through roving 
investigation teams who went to the oustee’s new villages.  NBA praised its work, and Madhya Pradesh 
and Maharashtra created their own Grievance Redressal Authorities modeled on it in 2000.  
 
                                                 
24 World Commission on Dams.  2000.  Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan. 
 
25 Wood. 2007, p. 175.  This inspired an additional commentary from her.  See “My argument is not anti-Gujarat: Roy,” The 
Indian Express 31 July 1999. 
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The impact of all these changes was foreshadowed in the Indian Supreme Court’s February 1999 decision 
to permit raising the Sardar Sarovar Dam from 80.3 to 85 meters (278.8 feet).  NBA was unhappy to see 
the project given new life, pro-dam opinion was unhappy to see that the height was short of the 110 meters 
(360.8 feet) needed to create a reservoir high enough to fill the canal.  It became clearer in October 2000 
when a three-member bench26 of the Indian Supreme Court ruled on the case Narmada Bachao Andolan v. 
Union of India and Others. 27  In a two-to-one decision, it invoked the common law doctrine of latches to 
rule that the NBA had failed to raise its objections in a timely manner, that the Court was not going to 
review issues related to design of the dam itself but only the fundamental rights of the oustees guaranteed 
by Article 21 of the Constitution, and reminded the parties that the decision of a Water Disputes Tribunal 
could not be challenged by private parties once it became binding on the states involved.  The decision 
rejected NBA claims that the Ministry of Environment and Forests decision to grant conditional clearance of 
the project in 1987 was itself a violation of Article 21 because it was taken on political grounds rather than 
after taking full account of the environmental impacts.  Rather, the establishment of a Narmada 
Management Authority with an environmental sub-group having authority to recommend stopping work to 
address negative environmental impacts and imposition of the pari passu condition that resettlement must 
precede successive raisings of the dam height, indicated to the majority that the decision was based on 
serious consideration of the environmental and social impacts.  The majority made extensive reference to 
the need to balance benefits and burdens and to India’s growing need for reliable water supplies in 
concluding that Sardar Sarovar and other dams in the Narmada Project should be built.  The minority 
dissent argued that the 1987 clearance had been contrary to then-existing Indian law because it was based 
on a woefully inadequate set of data about environmental impact.  It suggested that the Government of 
India should be required to do a full environmental impact assessment before further work on the Sardar 
Sarovar Dam.28 
 
The majority decision left the control institutions established by the NWDT – the Narmada Control Authority 
and the 6-member NCA Review Committee consisting of the chief ministers of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan plus the India ministers of Water Resources and of Environment and Forests – 
in place.  It concluded the ruling with these directions: 
 
1) Construction of the dam will continue as per the Award of the Tribunal. 
 
2) As the Relief and Rehabilitation Sub-group have cleared the construction up to 90 meters, the 
same can be undertaken immediately. Further raising of the height will be only pari passu with the 
implementation of the relief and rehabilitation and on the clearance by the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Sub-group. The Relief and Rehabilitation Sub-Group will give clearance of further construction after 
consulting the three Grievances Redressal Authorities. 
 
                                                 
26 The Indian Supreme Court consists of a Chief Justice and 26 Justices; particular cases are heard by Benches of three, five, 
seven, nine, or eleven Justices depending on the subject matter.  See Supreme Court of India. 2010.  Practice and Procedure: A 
Handbook of Information.  3rd ed.  New Delhi: Supreme Court of India.  Available at 
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/handbook3rdedition.pdf (accessed 28 July 2010). 
 
272000 AIR 3751; 2000(4) Suppl.SCR  94.  Also available through the Supreme Court website using the search utility at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp (accessed 28 July 2010).  
 
28 The dissent does not appear on the Supreme Court website.  Its terms are summarized from Wood 2007 187-188. 
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3) The Environment Sub-group under the Secretary, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government 
of India will consider and give, at each stage of the construction of the dam, environment clearance 
before further construction beyond 90 meters can be undertaken.  
 
4) The permission to raise the dam height beyond 90 meters will be given by the Narmada Control 
Authority, from time to time, after it obtains the above-mentioned clearances from the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Sub-group and the Environment Sub-group. 
 
5) The reports of the Grievances Redressal Authorities, and of Madhya Pradesh in particular, shows 
that there is a considerable slackness in the work of identification of land, acquisition of suitable 
land and the consequent steps necessary to be taken to rehabilitate the project oustees.  We direct 
the States of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat to implement the Award and give relief 
and rehabilitation to the oustees in terms of the packages offered by them and these States shall 
comply with any direction in this regard which is given either by the NCA or the Review Committee 
or the Grievances Redressal Authorities. 
 
6) Even though there has been substantial compliance with the conditions imposed under the 
environment clearance the NCA and the Environment Sub-group will continue to monitor and 
ensure that all steps are taken not only to protect but to restore and improve the environment. 
 
7) The NCA will within four weeks from today draw up an Action Plan in relation to further construction 
and the relief and rehabilitation work to be undertaken.  Such an Action Plan will fix a time frame so 
as to ensure relief and rehabilitation pari passu with the increase in the height of the dam.  Each 
State shall abide by the terms of the action plan so prepared by the NCA and in the event of any 
dispute or difficulty arising, representation may be made to the Review Committee.  However, each 
State shall be bound to comply with the directions of the NCA with regard to the acquisition of land 
for the purpose of relief and rehabilitation to the extent and within the period specified by the NCA. 
 
8) The Review Committee shall meet whenever required to do so in the event of there being any un-
resolved dispute on an issue which is before the NCA.  In any event the Review Committee shall 
meet at least once in three months so as to oversee the progress of construction of the dam and 
implementation of the R&R programmes.  If for any reason serious differences in implementation of 
the Award arise and the same cannot be resolved in the Review Committee, the Committee may 
refer the same to the Prime Minister whose decision, in respect thereof, shall be final and binding 
on all concerned. 
 
9) The Grievances Redressal Authorities will be at liberty, in case the need arises, to issue 
appropriate directions to the respective States for due implementation of the R&R programmes and 
in case of nonimplementation of its directions, the GRAs will be at liberty to approach the Review 
Committee for appropriate orders. 
 
10) Every endeavor shall be made to see that the project is completed as expeditiously as possible.29 
 
                                                 
29Judgment, pages 75-76. 
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As the dam builders resumed work, the value of such large projects had come under intense scrutiny in 
India and elsewhere.  Reevaluation had begun before the World Commission on Dams first met, but was 
strongly reinforced by its report and by the growing global interest in finding more ecologically sensitive 
ways of building physical infrastructure.  In India, reconsideration was greatly advanced by advocates of 
“human scale” development who looked to both traditional Indian practices and new ideas from around the 
world.30  The Centre for Science and Environment, an “alternative development” think tank, issued a very 
comprehensive study of traditional technologies in different parts of India that highlighted their small-scale, 
relatively low cost, and reliance on local management.31  Growing awareness that the groundwater 
resources being tapped by drilled wells were declining revived interest in finding ways to conserve water, 
improve capturing of monsoon water, and increase recharging of groundwaters. 
 
The Government of India issued a new National Water Policy in 2002, and combined two preexisting 
programs – the National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas and the Watershed 
Development Project – plus other water-related projects into one set of water development activities under 
a common set of Hariyali (“Greening”) Guidelines in 2003.  These replaced the previous practice of 
promoting water project work in villages through central government programs providing food in return for 
work, which quite important in the 1960s when frequent drought meant India often depended on food 
imports including large amount of food aid from the USA under its Public Law 480 program.  The 
Guidelines specified that village water projects would be run by the Panchayati Raj (council rule) institutions 
of local government, which had been given new, more open, rules and expanded tasks in 1992.32  The 
village, block, or district panchayat (council) would serve as the coordinating body, and initiate projects after 
the people in the village, block, or district had been consulted about and agreed to the proposed project.  
This put project design, management, and maintenance at the local level.  This ran across longstanding 
efforts by many Indian NGOs using a participatory development approach emphasizing the promotion of 
local leadership and activity that had been working on rural water projects.33  Feared that the change would 
inhibit their ability to run truly bottom-up projects even though the Guidelines do allow a local council to 
select an NGO as the “Project Implementation Agency” coordinating construction and maintenance of the 
particular flood control and water retention facilities the villagers select. 
 
In parallel with the new projects to construct water-control and storage facilities in villages, there was also a 
significant revision to management of irrigation systems in India.  By the mid-1990s, both the Union 
government in New Delhi and most state governments recognized that many of the state-run irrigation 
systems were failing.  Farmers were complaining that many of them were inefficient, poorly maintained, and 
often failed to deliver expected water to farms at any distance from the canal because farmers closer to the 
canal would tap the pipes to get extra.  At the same time, water management officials complained that 
water rates were too low to cover the costs of managing and maintaining current irrigation systems, much 
                                                 
30 Such as Vandana Shiva.  1990.  Ecology and the Politics of Survival: Conflicts over Natural Resources in India.  New Delhi: 
Sage Publications and Tokyo: United Nations University Press or Alka Srivastava and Janaki Chundi.  1999.  Watershed 
Management: Key to Sustainable Development.  New Delhi: Indian Social Institute. 
 
31 Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain. 1997.  Dying Wisdom: Rise, Fall, and Potential of India’s Traditional Water Harvesting 
Systems.  New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. 
 
32 Constitution of India, Amendment 73. 
 
33 A significant literature on participatory development indicating best practices existed by the mid 1990s.  E.g., Robert 
Chambers. 1997.  Whose Reality? Putting the First Last (London: Intermediate Technology Publications);    
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less add to them.  In some parts of the country, including Gujarat, the farmers poorly served by irrigation 
systems were so desperate to get water in time to grow their crops that private suppliers emerged to fill the 
demand.  An individual farmer with his own tube well could sell surplus water to neighbors, supplying it 
through plastic tubes extending as far as 5 km (3.1 miles) away from the well.  Though the private water 
sellers tend to charge high rates, and some farmers had to pay for their irrigation water before they 
received any,34 farmers, worried that their whole investment in a crop may be lost because they will not get 
the irrigation water in time, will pay extra for the certainty of supply from the well. 
 
Gujarat was heavily affected by these problems.  The extent of the situation is indicated by a study done in 
Gujarat that determined that water rates were covering about 8% of the cost of actually delivering water to 
farmers.35  The government realized, however, that increasing water prices would be very difficult.  Senior 
officials in the Gujarat Water Resources Department decided in 1995 to address the problem with a new 
program of Participatory Irrigation and Management.  Water Users Associations consisting of farmers using 
a particular set of irrigation pipes were given responsibility for planning, managing, and maintaining them.  
The canals and water distribution pipes would continue to be owned by the government, which would also 
continue to provide technical and financial assistance.  Participatory Irrigation Management was extended 
to all parts of India after 2002, though it had been suggested in the 1987 National Water Policy references 
to involving farmers in managing and maintaining irrigation systems.  Because water is a state level 
responsibility, each state has discretion to develop its own version of Participatory Irrigation Management; 
the Ministry of Water Resources in New Delhi has been active in encouraging the sharing of best practices 
and comparing actual progress in the various systems.  The World Bank and the Ford Foundation have 
also provided the Government of India with money to send state irrigation officials and staff from NGOs 
working on water works or other village programs to other countries where participatory irrigation is more 
established, including the Philippines, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, to learn about projects there.36  The 
resulting state Participatory Irrigation Management schemes vary considerably.  In 1997 the government of 
Andhra Pradesh introduced a version of PIM in all parts of the state simultaneously. Other states have used 
more incremental approaches, starting pilot projects in a few villages and then extending the more 
successful schemes to others. 
 
John R. Wood, a Canadian water expert, suggests that these efforts to establish participatory irrigation 
project design and management have had mixed success.  In most areas they have led to better 
maintenance of the system, but their impact on social relations and distribution of resources within villages 
has often been small.  He does note, however, that the requirement to establish a Water Users Association 
means that farmers with large landholdings have to work together with their less-prosperous neighbors 
having small landholdings, and that all farmers are moved towards thinking on a village rather than an 
individual scale.  However, the overall social effects of participatory irrigation depend on the extent to which 
the poor and traditionally marginalized groups like dalits (untouchables; “scheduled castes” in the language 
                                                 
34 Wood 2007, p. 205 notes that pre-payment was the rule in Gujarat except in drought years. 
 
35 Ecotech Services.  1996.  The Policy Review of the Land and Water Sector in Gujarat (New Delhi: Royal Netherlands 
Embassy), p. 32. 
 
36 For instance, Nirmal Sengupta.  1991.  Managing Common Property: Irrigation in India and the Philippines.  Indo-Dutch 
Studies on Development Alternatives.  New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
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of Indian law) are included in village activity.  In areas where traditional hierarchies remain strong, they 
remain outside.37 
 
The small-scale technologies being used in the projects will allow villages receiving enough rain during the 
monsoons to move towards self-sufficiency in water.  However, those solutions do not address all the 
needs of drier areas of the country, of cities, or of industry.  Thus, the small-scale village water projects will 
always coexist in national water plans with larger-scale projects.  This is foreseen in the Narmada River 
Project, with its connected network of small, medium, and large dams coordinated by computer to provide 
both hydroelectric generation and water supply.  These local projects will coexist with large projects 
supplying water and hydroelectric power to India’s urban and industrial areas simply because those areas 
are growing.  As India's economy has developed, there is greater appreciation of the multiple purposes to 
which large dams can be put.  The lesson came to Madhya Pradesh in a different way, when it lost a 
considerable portion of its potential electricity supply as 16 districts in the southeast, where much of 
Madhya Pradesh’s coal and thermal power generation capacity was located, were split off to form the new 
state of Chhattisgarh.  With power blackouts increasing in Bhopal, its largest city, the state government 
began to regard building Sardar Sarovar Dam to the full height of 138.68 meters (455 feet) as essential to 
meeting electricity demand.  Madhya Pradesh also became more anxious to speed up construction of the 
dams and hydroelectric power houses along its stretch of the Narmada, so anxious that it agreed to have 
construction work taken over by the central government's National Hydro-electric Power Corporation when 
the private contractors hired initially ran into financial difficulties.  Speeding up a dam construction also 
required speeding up the process of resettling people.  This was complicated in some places by the 
seasonal pattern of river flow.  Significant additional areas of "drawdown" land -- land that is underwater for 
part of the year but reemerges in the dry season as the reservoir empties and can be used to grow a 
vegetable or watermelon crop in that season – made it harder to define who should be counted as an 
oustee because owners of that land often wanted to hold on to it.38 
 
The continuing severity of demand for water in Gujarat meant that as soon as the Supreme Court handed 
down its judgment in 2000 construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam resumed.  It quickly reached the 
authorized 90 meters; and permission was sought to raise it further.  It stood 95m high by the end of 2002 
and 100 meters high in 2003.  The 100-meter height created a reservoir high and long enough to fill the 
irrigation canal.  By the end of 2005 that canal was complete almost to the Gujarat border, with construction 
of the extension into Rajasthan under way.  
 
As construction of Sardar Sarovar’s additional height and of upriver dams in Madhya Pradesh proceeded, 
more disputes broke out about treatment of oustees from those projects arose.  Allegations that Madhya 
Pradesh was failing to provide “land for land” were rife; the state government claimed that many oustees 
preferred money to land.  Villagers from Jalsindhi petitioned the Supreme Court for a review, and its March 
                                                 
37 Wood 2007, Chapter 9. 
 
38 The question of how many people are affected has been controversial from the start, with BNA and others citing higher 
numbers and the state governments lower ones.  Even the World Bank acknowledged numbers varying from 67,340 to 127,446 
for Sardar Sarovar alone between 1985 and 1994.  Jonathan A. Fox.  1998.  “When does reform policy influence practice?” in 
Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, eds., The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge MA: MIT Press), 
Table 9.1, p. 324. 
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2005 ruling reaffirmed the “land for land” requirement.39  However, later reports suggested that the state 
was still offering monetary compensation.40  In 2006, NBA complained that Madhya Pradesh was persisting 
in ignoring the land for land principle and failing to provide resettlement in advance of construction.  
Madhya Pradesh officials contended in return that most of the oustees wanted money rather than land.  
The same issue that had triggered the initial NBA activism -- fair treatment for those whose homes would 
be lost to rising waters -- was still very much alive despite all the changes in Indian politics and in Indian 
policy regarding water management over the more than 20 years of contention.  Similar contentions swirl 
around construction of the other large Narmada dams.41 
 
Lessons for scientists and engineers 
 
The Narmada Dams controversy provides apt demonstration of the ways that large physical infrastructure 
projects can generate strong contentions among their many stakeholders.  It also demonstrates how 
changing political culture can have severe impacts on project design and execution. 
 
The idea of building a dam at Navagam on the Narmada River inspired controversy from the beginning, 
even when the only stakeholders included in the discussions were the governments of the three states 
through which the river flows: Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra.  All three wanted to tap the 
river’s potential as a source of drinking and irrigation water and of hydroelectric power, but they disagreed 
about the most effective way to harness the river with dams.  Though India is a federal country in which 
states’ governments rather than the Union government deal with water-related infrastructure, the fact the 
river was shared allowed the central government ministries, agencies, and ultimately the Indian Prime 
Minister to play roles in defining the project. 
 
In 1947-65, when early versions of the Narmada Project were being considered, it was commonplace in its 
ambitions though Gujarat’s proposals would make the Sardar Sarovar Dam one of the largest concrete 
gravity dams in the world.42  The project was designed to rely on centralized, large-scale infrastructure to 
meet the challenges of supplying water and electricity to a large area of a country with facing stiff 
challenges in water management because it receives its annual rainfall in two highly concentrated periods 
and possessing few fossil fuel resources.  The procedures for defining and designing the project followed 
the usual path of such projects in democratic countries: elected officials defined the broad parameters of 
the project; civil servants and government-employed experts in hydrology, dam design, canal design, and 
construction of such projects worked out the details.  The broad needs of users were considered, as were 
                                                 
39 Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Ors, Writ Petition (Civil) 328 of 2002, decided March 2003.  2005 AIR 2994, 
2005(2) SCR 840. Also available through the Supreme Court website using the search utility at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp (accessed 28 July 2010). 
 
40 “Cash not land on offer for oustees,” The Hindu 1 December 2005. 
 
41 E.g., Eric Yep, “The Maheshwar Dam – A short-lived victory?”  India Real Time, Wall Street Journal Digital Network, 10 May 
2010 at http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/05/10/the-maheshwar-dam-a-short-lived-victory/ (accessed 4 August 2010); 
Suchandana Gupta, “Maheshwar Dam: PMO lifts ban on work,” Times of India, 9 May 2010 at 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5908453.cms (accessed 4 Ag. 2010).  
 
42 Central Water Commission.  2004.  Water and Related Statistics. (New Delhi: Central Water Commission, May 2004), p. 60 
says that Sardar Sarovar is the third largest such dam, after the Soufengyng Dam in China and the Grand Coulee Dam in the 
USA. 
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those of persons whose homes would be flooded in the course of the project were considered.  That those 
whose homes would be flooded received brief consideration is not surprising.  They were politically 
immobilized populations having relatively small numbers (in a country the size of India or in comparison to 
the number who would benefit from the water and electricity to be supplied) of low social status living in 
remote areas.  Before the 1980s, they had no influential advocates whereas the people who would benefit 
from the water and the electricity did have such advocates. 
 
Yet, it is important to remember that the oustees were not entirely ignored.  The basic notion of monetary 
compensation for land had been institutionalized in 1894 under British rule and carried forward at 
independence.  Individual project managers, civil servants, and members of the political elite did realize 
that the system of payment for land often failed oustees, particularly unsophisticated and often illiterate 
rural dwellers.  The judges named to the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal were cognizant of that history, 
and determined to do better by ordering that oustees be compensated with land somewhere else in the 
area to be irrigated by waters of the reservoir that would inundate their original homes.  Yet, unlike later 
advocates of indigenous peoples, who would take up the cause of adivasi oustees in the 1980s, members 
of the tribunal made no provision for adivasi to move as villages and re-create their traditional modes of 
living; they believed that everyone displaced would be better off in the modern farming villages to be 
created. 
 
Though the environmental and social impact criticisms of the Sardar Sarovar Dam, and the Narmada 
Project as a whole were raised simultaneously in the late 1980s, resettlement was the primary basis of 
local challenge and transnational advocacy coalition activity.  The most active Indian advocates for the 
oustees, the Narmada Bachao Andolan, raised three issues: compliance with the NWDT Award 
requirement of “land for land,” making provision for adivasi to continue their traditional ways, and lack of 
consultation with all stakeholders, including those who would be displaced, during initial consideration of 
the project.  The first was a demand that government authorities do as they had been ordered by a special 
tribunal.  It refers to the Indian government’s own standards and failure of the governments involved to 
follow through in ways the advocacy groups desire has inspired continued mobilization and contention. 
 
The second and third issues involved demands to apply newly emerged standards to an already begun 
activity.  Here, the advocacy groups encounter greater opposition because a lot of money has been spent 
and the larger numbers of stakeholders anticipating benefits from water use and/or hydropower generation 
are growing impatient with the long delays stemming from the controversies.  The term “indigenous 
peoples” denoting distinct populations living in traditional ways who should have their right to maintain 
those ways protected was initially applied to native peoples living in an area colonized by Europeans – like 
Aboriginals in Australia, Maoris in New Zealand, and the many groups variously called “Indians,” “First 
Nations,” and “Native Americans” in the Western Hemisphere.  In the 1990s, it was expanded to include 
any relatively isolated group, somehow ethnically distinct from the rest of the population of a country that 
continues to live in its traditional ways.  This expanded definition included the adivasi and similar groups in 
Africa and other parts of Asia.43  Though Indian legislation has provided certain legal protections for adivasi, 
the Government of India has resisted the notion that they should be regarded as “indigenous” and covered 
by UN definitions of distinct indigenous rights.  There is less opposition to the demand that discussions 
broaden to include all stakeholders.  Since the efflorescence of NGOs and advocacy groups in the 1980s, 
the notion of “bottom up” project planning emerging in development and public policy literatures and 
                                                 
43Notd in J. K. Das. 2001. Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (New Delhi: APH). 
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practice around the world has won a wider following in India.  Yet, this sentiment often coexists with support 
for large projects when it can be shown that operating only at a small local scale will not fully address some 
particular need. 
 
The environmental challenges to Sardar Sarovar and the whole Narmada Project were strengthened in the 
1990s as concepts of ecological sustainability and sustainable development became more widely accepted.  
The World Commission on Dams marked the transition from old to new visions of water management at the 
international level, but its work drew on and helped reinforce reconsiderations already underway in many 
countries, including India.  These challenges did not affect the basic design of Sardar Sarovar Dam, which 
was set by 1980, or the basic parameters of the Narmada project.  However, they did inform project 
management techniques, and the organization of the irrigation systems tied to the canal supplying 
Narmada waters to Gujarat and Rajasthan. 
 
Transnational advocacy had three intertwined but distinct effects on the Narmada Dams: adding to the 
weight of oustee advocates in India, encouraging new visions of water management in all of India, and 
persuading major shareholders of the World Bank to stop Bank involvement in lending for Sardar Sarovar 
Dam. 
 
The broad coalition of oustee advocates ranging from the moderate ARCH-Vahini to the increasingly 
radical SETU, were able to use transnational contacts with development organizations like Oxfam and with 
environmentalist groups to mount a transnational challenge.  Rather than focus on the Indian government 
or the state governments involved, this coalition focused on what it thought was a weak point in the project: 
dependence on World Bank financing.  The World Bank and other MDBs were already being criticized for 
failure to pay sufficient attention to the social and ecological impacts of their projects; it was easy to add the 
Narmada Project as another example.  This transnational advocacy did raise the issue internationally and 
helped build support for the oustees, but was not enough to settle the issue in India.  The pari passu 
requirement that oustees must be resettled before the next increment of height is added to Sardar Sarovar 
had several effects: 1) it spread the project costs over a longer period, 2) it gave mostly unprepared state 
governments longer to muster their capacities or join efforts with NGOs already working in villages, and 3) 
kept the issue alive longer.  Narmada Bachao Andolan is still campaigning, using the full repertoire of 
Gandhian civil resistance techniques, on oustees’ behalf.  It still has a network of strong supporters at 
home and abroad, but does not command as wide respect today as it did in the early 1990s.44  Its 
continuing campaigns for the oustees, the most recent in spring 2010,45 have held the Indian and state 
governments more closely to the terms of the NWDT Award, but have not realized the greater ambition of 
stopping the project altogether.  Even if elites were inclined to give in to NBA’s continuing sit-ins and fasting 
protests, the user groups are too large for the project to be abandoned.  They are more numerous, have 
more votes, and at various times have mounted effective counter-mobilizations.  Today, the agricultural and 
urban users are confident that the whole Narmada Project will be built, but are now worrying that a new set 
                                                 
 
44See comments in, e.g., Tavleen Singh, “Luddite sisters.” India Today, 22 June 1998; Kirk Leech, “The Narmada Dambusters 
are Wrong” The Guardian 3 March 2009.  
 
45“Narmada Bachao Abndolan protests against resettlement program failures regarding Maheshwar Dam in Madhya Pradesh,” 
available at http://blog.taragana.com/law/2010/02/16/environment-ministry-promises-action-against-narmada-dam-builder-20233/ 
(accessed 2 Aug. 2010). 
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of users – industry – now wants a share of Narmada waters.  Farmers and households are mobilizing to 
limit allocations to industry on grounds the NWDT Award gave priority to irrigation and drinking water.46  
 
Transnational networking on issues of water management, dam design, and sustainable development 
provided opportunities for professionals concerned with the environment to advocate new models of water 
infrastructure – smaller in scale, lower in cost, more attuned to natural cycles.  The World Commission on 
Dams made these discussions more visible to the general public, but they would have proceeded as new 
generations of technical experts trained to pay more attention to the environmental and social impacts of 
projects rose in their professions.  How these new ideas play out depends very much on conditions in each 
area: small projects can help villages, individual farms, and households with enough land to build their own 
storage tanks.  Cities and industrial complexes will still need larger-scale water infrastructure, though both 
can do more to use water more efficiently and lose less of it to leaky pipes, contamination by human or 
animal wastes, or pollution from industrial processes. 
 
Pressuring major member governments to block World Bank loans in 1992 did not work out quite as the 
transnational advocacy coalition hoped.  The campaign did call attention to severe problems with World 
Bank lending and lead to changes in its policies and practices.  It did not lead to stopping or significantly 
scaling back Sardar Sarovar Dam or the larger Narmada Project.   The Indian and state governments 
remained sufficiently committed to fund the project out of their own resources, resources that have become 
more plentiful as the pace of India’s economic development picked up in the 1990s and 2000s.  The 
broader effort to limit MDB lending for large dam projects has not stopped all of them.  Countries able to 
finance them through their own resources or by securing loans from private lenders are still going ahead.  
Contemporary dam projects can benefit from lessons provided by the Narmada Project experience, but the 
extent they do will depend primarily on the orientations of the national actors involved.  Transnational 
contacts can help spread new ideas, but will only have effect on the politics of dam projects in countries 
where national institutions permit a wide range of stakeholders to participate effectively in decisions. 
 
 
<End> 
 
                                                 
46E.g., remarks of former SSNNL chairman Sanat Mehta at a meeting commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Sardar Sarovar 
Project pointing out the lagging development of irrigation systems connecting to the canal and expressing concern that low 
agricultural use would give industrial groups chances to get allocations, reported in The Indian Express, xx April 2010 and 
available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/narmada-dam-veterans-criticise-slow-work/600010/ (accessed 2 Aug. 2010). 
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